







IN SPITE OF D’ANNUNZIO: 
RECODING FEMININITY IN 
TRIONFO DELLA MORTE 
 
 




Ad un’analisi critica, la figura di Ippolita Sanzio in Trionfo della morte sembra 
oscillare tra rappresentazioni ideali e spirituali.  Mutuando da Adriana 
Cavarero la nozione di “furto concettuale”, è possibile rileggere il corpo 
erotico di Ippolita come sistema semiotico capace di sfuggire al 
fallocentrisimo del suo creatore.  Così, malgrado sia frutto del pensiero 
maschile, Ippolita contribuisce alla rappresentazione della soggettività 
femminile che può essere interpretata fuori dai canoni tradizionali del sistema 
patriarcale.  Infine, l’oscillazione di Ippolita minacia la nozione di opposizioni 
incontaminate su cui si fonda la struttura binaria occidentale. 
 
 
It would seem to make little sense to search for representations of 
femininity within male authored texts if indeed sexual difference 
complicates male knowledge of women. For if traditional 
representations of women are male fabrications then one must conclude 
that they are removed from reality. Yet, what if it were possible to find 
symptoms of what appear to be resistances, within such 
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misrepresentations of women, in spite of what one would take to be 
authorial intention? Then these sites of misinformation become a 
valuable tool with which to deconstruct such representations.
1
  
According to Shoshana Felman, in her book What Does a Woman 
Want, patriarchal culture has taught us to identify with the male 
dominant perspective, which is always taken as a measure of the 
universal (5).  How, then, can one successfully uncover the female 
mind if it has been subjected to centuries of misidentification? Felman 
believes that texts are self-transgressive with respect to the ideologies 
that consciously produce them (5). This is why she trains herself to 
“tune into the forms of resistance present in the text […] in other 
words […] seek to trace within each text its own resistance to itself, its 
own specific literary, inadvertent textual transgression of its male 
assumptions and prescriptions” (6). While such self-transgression 
might appear to be undetectable, it becomes visible through the active 
involvement of the readers who, in our case, are women (6). Of course 
the risk of searching for textual resistances in male-authored 
representations of femininity is that if they appear to be subversive 
subjects, these figures are nonetheless products of a higher male 
authority (the author), and all expressions of self-transgression could 
easily be construed as intentional and, more importantly, male, which 
in turn undermines any concept of a female resistance. In order for me 
to interpret these signs as resistances to male misconception, it will be 
necessary to remove the female character from her context and relocate 
her to a controversially new one. In other words, I boldly intend to 
perform the kind of “conceptual theft” Adriana Cavarero performs in 
her work In Spite of Plato. 
Cavarero explains the process of re-appropriation of male-authored 
female figures in the following manner: 
                                                
1  Although I am aware of the Derridian inference that the term “deconstruct” bears, I would 





[…] my hermeneutical project consists of investigating 
the traces of the original act of erasure contained in the 
patriarchal order, the act upon which this order was 
first constructed and then continued to display itself. 
This is how my technique of theft works: I will steal 
feminine figures from their contexts, allowing the torn 
up fabric to show the knots that hold together the 
conceptual canvas that hides the original crime. (5)  
 
The stolen figures are then rearranged on the canvas of a new symbolic 
order thus providing an alternate text and context in which women can 
be viewed. The premise through which Cavarero justifies her theft lies 
in the relationship between the female reader and the female character 
(1-9). When the reader is a woman and a feminist, suggests Cavarero, 
there is a relation of identity and recognition between her and the 
woman in the text: both are trapped in a masculine conceptual 
universe. However, it is precisely because of this relation that the 
female reader is afforded the possibility of altering both the reception 
and the political usefulness of the texts she interrogates. She may 
refuse to accept at face value the male author’s representation of the 
female voice and instead read as a woman reading women-in-text. To 
illustrate her point, Cavarero returns to the myths where Western 
philosophical thought systematically suppressed the female presence 
and she rereads them in the light of female experience. Because the 
masculine symbolic system cannot genuinely represent that experience, 
it is the task of feminist subjects, the new readers of these 
male-authored texts, to render visible different figurations of female 
subjectivity. It is such rereading that I will perform in Gabriele 
D’Annunzio’s Trionfo della morte, for Ippolita provides a pertinent 
site in which resistance is visible through a new reading of her actions.
2
  
                                                
2 The possibilities of finding symptoms of resistances are numerous throughout much of 
Gabriele D’Annunzio’s work. It is simply for a question of brevity that I have chosen to limit 
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this essay to a single novel.  
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Many of D’Annunzio’s female characters fall into the dichotomous 
categories of Madonna and Whore.
3
  Judith Butler points out that 
because cultural constructions such as these stereotypes have been 
perpetuated for so long under the guise of ontological truths, 
sometimes the distinction between what is culturally constructed and 
what is not cultural productions becomes obfuscated (Gender Trouble, 
viii). If Butler is correct in remarking that the determination of gender 
treats as origin and cause those identity categories which are in fact the 
effects of institutions, practices, discourses, then D’Annunzio’s female 
characters need to be treated as cultural productions rather than a 
realistic interpretation of femininity. Hence, while it might seem 
counterproductive to use cultural productions as a foreground for an 
analysis, the project is justified insofar as it is because these 
productions are constructions that one can pull them apart. I am, thus, 
positioning myself in part as a “reader,” analyzing representations of 
the female gender that take place in D’Annunzio’s text.
4
 The purpose 
                                                
3 To name a few examples, in Il piacere, Elena represents the sexual figure, while Maria is the 
spiritual figure; in Le vergini delle rocce, Violante is the sensual woman, while Massimilla is 
the pious woman; in Il fuoco ‘Perdita’ is the carnal woman, while ‘Arianna’ is his spiritual 
inspiration; in La Gioconda Silvia is the spiritual figure, while Gioconda is the sexual lover. 
4 An early wave of feminist literary criticism positioned women as readers of male-produced 
texts, reading from a different perspective, for it was felt that as women, our understanding of 
these same texts diverged from mainstream (male) criticism. The subjects of this type of 
analysis included “the images and stereotypes of women in literature, the omissions of and 
misconceptions about women in criticism, and the fissures in male-constructed literary 
history” as well as a concern with the implicit manipulative effect such an exploitative system 
would have on women (“Toward a Feminist Poetics,” 128). This first approach offered a 
subversive interpretation of the canon, challenging sexist ideology (“Treason To Our Text,” 
107). Women no longer wanted to identify with negative and fatal images of femininity – 
images in which they did not recognize themselves to begin with. It was therefore necessary 
that women gather the courage to publicly express their own unheard opinion: women’s 
voices no longer belonged to the invisible domain of the private (female) individual, rather, 
they came together to denounce representations of femininity as “structural inconsistency” 
(“Dancing Through The Minefield,” 144-45). It soon became clear that a critique and 
rejection of the male canon was unsatisfactory, for while it exposed acts of sexism, it did not 
offer positive and affirming images of femininity with which women could identify. It then 
became necessary to turn to different texts (“Dancing Through The Minefield,” 145). A 
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of my analysis, however, is not to unearth misleading stereotypes but 
rather to focus on symptoms of resistances that can be found within 
these stereotypes. My position, then, would not be just that of a 
“reader” of male-authored texts: the discovery of a second “text” no 
longer produced by the author or the male characters also positions the 
female subject as “writers.” The alter-text in question, while not being 
a text in the conventional sense, comes nonetheless under the form of a 
legible body (both figurative and literal) of interpretable signs, a form 
of literature carrying codes of an alternate symbolic system and 
therefore must be “read” and “interpreted” according to this different 
language of corporeality. Perhaps this approach could be described as a 
controversial sister of “gynocritics,” this time applied to 
female-authored “texts” found within the male-authored text. It is 
within this framework that my article finds its theoretical and political 
justification: if representation is a locus of a certain instability, a 




                                                                                                        
second wave of feminist criticism positioned women as writers. This time women produced 
“textual meaning with the history, themes, genres, and structures of literature by women” 
(“Towards A Feminist Poetics,” 128).  Such an approach included “the psychodynamics of 
female creativity; linguistics and the problem of a female language; the trajectory of the 
individual or collective female literary career; literary history; and […] studies of particular 
writers and works” (“Towards A Feminist Poetics,” 128). The exploration of the relationship 
between literary authority and the concept of a sexed individual was brought to the forefront, 
allowing women’s texts to constitute an alternative to male tradition. (“What Do Feminist 
Critics Want,” 36).   
5 I am borrowing the notion of a “troubled” gender from Judith Butler’s book Gender Trouble.  
While it is clear that Giorgio makes Ippolita responsible for both dressing and undressing, we 
can separate the author of each act, by claiming that the act of dressing reflects Giorgio’s 
desire to be Ippolita’s creator, while the act of undressing is not only threatening and therefore 
undesirable for Giorgio, but it becomes symptomatic of Ippolita’s rejection of patriarchal 
manipulation. 
Throughout the novel, representations of Ippolita frequently 
fluctuate between images of spiritual ideal and images of animal 
carnality. As a sexual being, Ippolita is inferior, lascivious and cause of 
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ruin and death: “con una inconcepibile intensità egli oramai nella 
persona d’Ippolita vedeva soltanto l’imagine astratta del sesso; vedeva 
soltanto l’essere inferiore, privo d’ogni spiritualità, semplice strumento 
di piacere e di lascivia, strumento di ruina e di morte” (819). As a 
spiritual being, she becomes luminous, free of any base and carnal 
attributes: 
 
E avveniva alfine su la soglia del rifugio il miracolo; 
poiché l’impura, la corrutrice, la implacabile Nemica, 
la Rosa dell’Inferno, si spogliava all’improvviso 
d’ogni peccato e si faceva tutta monda per seguire il 
compagno fino all’altare. Divenuta luminosa, ella 
illuminava la tenebra sacra. (862) 
 
Interestingly, the passage from carnal to spiritual or from spiritual to 
carnal takes place under the form of an undressing: in the above 
quotation, Ippolita “undressed herself” from all her sins. In a different 
passage, Ippolita “rientra in una casa a me ignota, rientra nella sua vita 
volgare, si spoglia dell’idealità di cui la vesto; diventa un’altra donna, 
una donna comune. Io non so più nulla di lei” (658-59). The garments, 
then, allow her to subsist as two-fold. The choice of garment, however, 
is not arbitrary, for as a sexual being, Ippolita is clearly threatening for 
Giorgio, while as a spiritual being, she bears nearly divine qualities and 
is therefore unthreatening. Further, as a spiritual being, Ippolita 
appears to be the product of Giorgio’s imagination (“Vedeva ora 
Ippolita vivente corrispondere all’ideale figura di lei, ch’egli nutriva 
nel cuore” 666), his creation (“Ella è una preziosa amante; è la mia 
creatura” 807), while as a carnal being, he no longer knows anything 
about her, she is unknown to him. Giorgio’s constant attempts to depict 
Ippolita as a spiritual ideal can be explained as an attempt to validate 
his role as creator and her existence as his creation. Her appearance as 
a sexual body is threatening, for as such she escapes Giorgio’s creative 
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grip and therefore is unknown and unknowable.
6
 If Giorgio is the 
“tailor” of the spiritual garment, and if Ippolita becomes unknown to 
him when wearing the carnal garment, then it might not be so 
presumptuous to assume that Ippolita is the tailor of the carnal 
garment. Although such an assumption is arguable, there is nonetheless 
a mark that Ippolita leaves in the carnal garment which comes under 
the form of a contamination of the ‘fabric’, as we shall later see, for her 
shuttle weaves its way through the threads. But for the moment I shall 
focus on the implications of wearing and removing the spiritual 
garment.  
Giorgio imagines that Ippolita voluntarily chooses to “wear” the 
image of luminous perfection: “E quella muta e terribile eloquenza 
prendeva per il giovine questa significazione distinta: Io [Ippolita] sono 
sempre l’invitta. Tu [Giorgio] hai conosciuto sul mio corpo tutti i 
godimenti di cui ha sete il tuo desiderio senza fine; ed io mi vestirò 
delle menzogne che senza fine produrrà il tuo desiderio” (918). By 
interpreting Ippolita’s actions to mean that she chooses to wear the 
image he offers her, Giorgio deceives himself into believing that she 
willfully adopts his image of spiritual perfection. If we take into 
consideration the use of the first person subject pronoun, combined 
with indicative mode (“io sono” and “io mi vestirò”), then the text, 
rather than the context, becomes the locus in which a transfer of 
intentionality is effected. She thus becomes the free agent who 
transmits to him the desire to enrobe herself in spiritual idealness. 
While this “transfer” of authority might initially be a psychological 
ruse to make Ippolita appear to want to be ideal, because Ippolita is 
also given the power to “undress” herself, we also get a sense that 
Ippolita is rejecting her representation of spiritual ideal. Although it is 
                                                
6 It is important to note that the sexual body with which Ippolita threatens Giorgio’s creativity 
must not be understood as a genuine representation of femininity, for it is just as much a male 
fabricated stereotype as the spiritual sister. Rather, as we shall later see, it is the fact that her 




Giorgio who chooses to view this act in such a manner, thus making 
Ippolita’s activity once again only imaginary, by separating the text 
(Giorgio’s fantasy) from the language in the text, it becomes possible 
to give new meaning to Ippolita’s activity: what was originally 
understood as a behavior manufactured by Giorgio’s imagination can 
also be reread as being manufactured by Ippolita herself. Through this 
alternate reading made possible through a literal understanding of the 
text, Ippolita becomes the agent of her actions. She may wear the robe 
of spiritual ideal, but she also rejects it by removing it, in spite of his 
desires. 
The garment of sexual carnality is also a cover that allows for a 
removal to take place, and, as we have seen, beneath the base and 
plebian attributes hide a luminous and ideal presence. Thus, when the 
ideal garment is removed, we discover a carnal presence, and when a 
carnal garment is removed, we discover a spiritual presence. Rather 
than two separate garments that get removed and replaced, Ippolita 
appears to be covered up in numerous onion-like layers, each one 
revealing, respectively, a luminous presence and a carnal presence. It is 
as if the shedding of layers were similar to a power struggle between 
the carnal and the spiritual, the bad and the good, the unknown and the 
know, and perhaps ultimately between Giorgio and Ippolita: while 
Giorgio tries to impose his imagined garment on Ippolita, Ippolita 
rejects this garment in order to expose her carnal vests. But since 
beneath that vest lies a luminous image, Ippolita can not maintain her 
status of carnality and is forced to remove yet another layer. 
Moreover, Ippolita’s challenge to expose her carnal attributes is 
compromised by a powerful mechanism of entrapment: the word 
“rivelare” (“la tendenza fittizia alle cose straordinarie, alla vita 
trascendente, al mistero – promosso in lei da Giorgio – s’appagava di 
quei segni che rivelavano un’alterazione profonda,” 951) means to 
reveal, to unveil. Yet ri-velare also means to re-veil, that is, to ‘veil’ a 
second time. In this case rivelare means both to reveal and to re-veil 
and therefore it is a gesture that both unveils what is concealed and 
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conceals what is already veiled. A rivelazione then can never truly 
expose, for it simultaneously conceals. The paradox brought forth by 
the term ri-velare exposes a structure that both traps Ippolita in 
Giorgio’s own definition of femininity, as well as protect him from 
Ippolita’s acts of disobedience: if he cannot prevent the woman from 
removing her spiritual cover, then he must resort to a labyrinthine play 
on words. However, exposing this subtle means of entrapment actually 
proves to be useful: once the structure has been made visible, it 
becomes necessary and possible to search for lose threads. As a female 
reader, I too shall take on the audacious task of removing and releasing 
the struggling figure from her inescapable destiny so that Ippolita may 
“sketch out” her own text.  The rereading I propose thus takes into 
consideration the layers covering Ippolita. If entrapment is possible 
because images of carnality can never truly be revealed, then given the 
fact that her layers appear to be infinite – the reader never gets a sense 
that there is a definitive and truthful representation of Ippolita – it is 
also true that the image of spirituality can never be revealed. In other 
words, if I invert the order of what veils and what is unveiled, the 
multiplicity of her layers allows me to affirm that the removal of her 
carnal vest does not genuinely reveal her spiritual being, for a 
revelation, as we have just established, is only deceptive. Hence, the 
mechanism of entrapment itself is complicated and reversible, by the 
process of infinite alternating layers. 
Thus far we have seen that Ippolita’s spiritual appearance comes 
under the form of a garment made up by Giorgio and placed on 
Ippolita. However, at times we also get the impression that this 
garment is a veil, a bandage covering Giorgio’s eyes. In the following 
passage, Giorgio imagines Ippolita’s words: “Io [Ippolita] posso in un 
attimo ritessere il velo che tu [Giorgio] hai lacerato; posso in un attimo 
rifasciarti della benda che hai tolta. Sono più forte del tuo pensiero. Io 
so il segreto delle mie trasfigurazioni nella tua anima.” (918). Since 
there is no mention of him being “fasciato,” the word “benda” refers to 
a metaphorical blindfold covering his eyes. He is, therefore, blind, a 
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condition which he imposes upon himself. A logical assumption, then, 
would be that his state of blindness implies that he cannot see a real 
image of Ippolita, but rather imagines it. The image of a spiritual 
Ippolita, then is the product of a blind vision, and therefore cannot 
genuinely represent the “real” Ippolita. Further, in a previous 
paragraph, we learn that the removal or the slashing of the veil exposes 
the unknowable image of a carnal Ippolita:  
 
Vide sé stesso, nel futuro, legato a quella carne come il 
servo al suo ferro, privo di volontà e di pensiero, 
istupidito a vacuo; e la concubina sfiorire, invecchiare, 
abbandonarsi senza resistenza all’opera lenta del 
tempo, lasciar cadere dalle sue mani inerti il velo 
lacerato delle illusioni ma conservar tuttavia il suo 
potere fatale […]. (916)  
 
Slashed and removed, the veil of illusions exposes an image which is 
clearly fearful. It is as if, whenever he gazes through the torn veil he 
sees her as a carnal being subject to organic deterioration. If Giorgio’s 
blindfold is this veil then it is also the cover that hides Ippolita’s 
reality, and the image of perfection is the garment with which she 
dresses herself, for what he “sees” when he is blindfolded is a figment 
of his imagination. Restoration of the “benda” would thus imply a 
restoration of her garment and of his momentarily lost illusion. Without 
his blindfold, Giorgio is forced to see what is clearly threatening to 
him, with his blindfold, he no longer is faced with the horrific vision. 
Hence the fact that the removal of the blindfold reveals an Ippolita who 
is unknown to him suggests that she is no longer the product of his 
imagination. In such case, the ideal form of Ippolita is nothing more 
than a travesty, literally and figuratively. Representation is thus 
misrepresentation, and the condition of blindness serves distinctly as a 
means to claim as real his own fabrications. Ippolita’s act of 
“undressing” is indeed the subversive act of forcing Giorgio to face an 
undesirable and unknown representation of femininity. 
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So far, it is Ippolita who replaces the blindfold/garment. And what 
is even more interesting and pertinent to our analysis is that it is 
Giorgio who gives Ippolita the active role of mending the torn veil: “Io 
posso in un attimo ritessere il velo che tu hai lacerato.” Although the 
garment may be the product of Giorgio’s imagination, it is Ippolita who 
is given the task of reweaving the veil. The male character’s “loss” of 
authorship becomes once again apparent: reinserted within this altered 
and alter text, the act of reweaving the lacerated cloth can be 
understood in subversive terms: taking into account the tradition of the 
woven text, it is possible to suggest that the rewoven text bears the 
distinctive mark of her handwriting, as the shuttle has found its way 
into her hands. Interpreting this gesture as an exchange of authorship 
thus becomes powerfully suggestive for the story told in the second 
text is no longer the same as the one imagined by Giorgio since it is 
produced by Ippolita. It is ultimately her handwriting that prevails. 
Hence this tapestry interwoven into Giorgio’s text becomes the image 
he is forced to see. And this image, I would venture to suggest, is the 
carnal body that is threatening because it is not authored by him, but by 
Ippolita instead. 
The sexual body she represents when free of her spiritual garment, 
then, leads us to the “body” Irigaray and Cixous refer to in their works, 
for the female character “put[s] herself into the text – as into the world 
and into history – by her own movement” (“Laugh of the Medusa,” 
334). While the body presented to us by D’Annunzio and his male 
character, and reproduced by the female protagonists are literary 
bodies, thus making any analogy with those presented to us by Irigaray 
and Cixous a precarious one, one must not forget that the bodies about 
which these two women write appear in and through a textual form, 
which makes them a product of literature as well. Arleen B. Dallery 
points out that “[a] woman’s body is always mediated by language; the 
human body is a text, a sign, not just a piece of fleshy matter” (The 
Politics, 54). One could argue, then, that there is no such thing as a 
“real” body, especially if “the meanings of the body in discourse 
 
 15
actually shape the materiality of the real body and its complementary 
desires” (The Politics, 59). Hence the “real” body one refers to in a 
phallocratic system, is in fact a fictitious and overly determined body. 
Because the body exists in language, it is a semiotic sign and therefore 
belongs to the order of the symbolic. What becomes appealing to 
feminists, then, is that by positing that bodies are built through 
language, it opens up the possibility of participating, on our own terms 
and in our own language, in the de(con)struction and reconstruction of 
ourselves as subjects and our bodies through a language that 
distinguishes itself from the phallocentric nature of the dominant 
language: “In speaking the body, writing is pulsed by this feminine 
libidinal economy and projects the meanings of a decensored body to 
be materially lived. A ‘real’ body prior to discourse is meaningless” 
(The Politics, 59). The “real” body is meaningless because it is a body 
without language and therefore without meaning, a body waiting to be 
marked by language: “Writing the body, then, is both constative and 
performative. It signifies those bodily territories that have been kept 
under seal; it figures the body. But, writing the body is also a 
performative utterance; the feminine libidinal economy inscribes itself 
in language” (The Politics, 59). As language rewrites the female body, 
so does the female body, through its “libidinal economy,” rewrite 
language. It is perhaps not coincidental that the effect of the sight of 
the “original” Ippolita is an aging hag rather than a seductive beauty: 
Ippolita carries within her both her own death as well as the ability to 
induce death. I am then inclined to celebrate the aging hag, not because 
she is an image of imperfection but because she marks a sight (and site) 
that is free from male manipulation. Of course, the aging hag is just as 
much a product of male fantasy as the other stereotypes, but her 
“lethal” power gains new meaning in this context of sexual difference. 
We have seen that Giorgio’s attempts to transform Ippolita into a 
spiritual image of perfection have been unsuccessful Ippolita has 
resisted and rewritten her own story. I would like to suggest, however, 
that there is still another reason why Giorgio is unsuccessful at 
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permanently enforcing the spiritual image: the female character is a 
victim of a malady which will cause her to be both inside and outside 
of her body: 
 
[Ippolita] teneva le mani raccolte nel grembo […]; e 
l’imaginazione dell’amante vedeva tra le dita ‘la 
ciocca dei capelli strappati […]’. Appariva e spariva 
come quella ciocca […] il fantasma dell’epilettico; – 
di quel medesimo che sotto il portico era caduto 
all’improvviso […]. Appariva e spariva il fantasma, 
quasi fosse il sogno della dormente esternato e reso 
visibile. (893) 
 
The male character revisits the scene of Ippolita’s epileptic attack in his 
imagination, focusing on the lock of hair, as it “appears and 
disappears.” And in the same fashion the sight of the hair appeared and 
disappeared in his memory, so does the phantom of another epileptic. 
And the phantasmatic body of the other person appears and disappears 
as if it were Ippolita’s “externalized dream.” Because her dream is 
compared to the phantom of an epileptic, I argue that this visible and 
externalized dream-like image is also the externalization of the self that 
takes place right before an epileptic seizure: preceding an epileptic 
attack, the victim feels as if his or her ego were no longer centered 
within the body, but rather floats outside of it, a phenomenon known as 
“autoscopy” (Volatile Bodies, 43). Following autoscopy is the more 
severe symptom of depersonalization: a psychical transformation in 
self-conception whereby the victim observes himself or herself with 
disinterest as if he or she were a spectator. It appears that 
depersonalization accounts for the phenomenon of the “out of body 
experience” (Volatile Bodies, 76). If D’Annunzio was not aware of 
such an occurrence, the reference to the externalized dream of the 
epileptic is quite intuitive and for our purposes, very fortunate, for the 
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dream of the “phantom” body and the externalization of the self 
become one and the same. In such case, Giorgio’s inability to fully 
possess Ippolita is not just the result of a “demonic” disease that has 
taken possession of her, but also the result of a split that her self has 
undergone, causing her to be present and absent, inside and outside her 
body, locked in and free of male representations of femininity.
7
  Hence 
if her epilepsy appears to be a titillating phenomenon for Giorgio, it is 
also a way for the female character to extract herself from an image of 
femininity that is purely manufactured by Giorgio. A “dramatic change 
in self-conception” could well be a form of refusal and consequent 
escape (Volatile Bodies, 43). Critics such as Susan Bordo have pointed 
out that women have rejected their restricting representations through 
forms of psychoses such as hysteria and eating disorders (“The Body 
And The Reproduction of Femininity,” 15). Psychoses, by having a 
direct or indirect effect on a person’s body, cause the body to become 
readable texts, and in these texts one can find the signs of rejections 
(“The Body,” 16). While epilepsy does not fall into the same category 
as these psychoses, the events that take place during a seizure allow her 
body to become an interpretable “text”: to begin with, Ippolita is forced 
to embody a lifeless image of “sovereign” perfection, a representation 
that is anything but ideal. Her body (or lack thereof) is thus “deeply 
inscribed with an ideological construction of femininity emblematic of 
the periods in question” (“The Body,” 16). The dual form of 
appearance (body and phantom of body residing outside of the body), 
caused by the epileptic seizures, presents the victim with a form of 
escape, thus becoming an expression of a refusal of such ideological 
constructions. However, as Bordo rightly points out, these forms of 
protest are also precarious since they call for silence, malady and 
                                                
7 According to Barbara Spackman, epilepsy, as “sacred (and demonic)” prevents Giorgio from 
fully possessing Ippolita because it “is a disease of possession, and so appears to figure the 
impossibility of any true priority, any total possession. The woman is already possessed, 
already of another. The attribution of epilepsy to Ippolita is a recognition of the 
insurmountable obstacles to the possession of the beloved” (Decadent Genealogies, 190-191). 
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self-destruction (“The Body,” 21): Ippolita may be escaping her 
limitations, but at the extraordinary cost of epileptic seizures. Of course 
her malady is the author’s choice which undermines any form of 
subversive feminine behavior. However, while the choice of epilepsy 
might originally be inspired by a desire to eroticize and pervert the 
disease, it inadvertently releases the woman from the entrapping 
mechanism with which phallocentric discourse has been able to 
perpetuate such misrepresentations.  
Outside of her self and other to herself, Ippolita may have been 
robbed of any claims of subjectivity.
8
  Yet a re-investigation of the 
implications of subjectivity, beginning with the reminder that our 
present notion of subjectivity belongs to a symbolic discourse that 
excludes women, perhaps it is no longer in our interest to make such 
claims. If subjectivity can only be understood within a phallocentric 
context, then it is this very form of (mis)identification that women must 
reject. Thus Ippolita is not truly losing any possibility of acquiring an 
identity as subject, she is simply refusing to conform to a notion of 
subjectivity that is foreign to her. 
                                                
8 According to Elizabeth Grosz, “for the subject to take up a position as a subject, it must be 
able to be situated in the space occupied by its body. This anchoring of subjectivity in its body 
is the condition of coherent identity, and, moreover, the condition under which the subject has 
a perspective on the world, and becomes a source for a vision, a point from which vision 
emanates and to which light is focused. Some psychotics are unable to locate themselves 
where they should be. They may look at themselves from outside, as another might; they may 
hear voices of others in their heads” (Volatile Bodies, 47).  
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Representations of women as whores, man-eaters, animals with 
uncontrollable sexual appetites, are clearly fictitious products of male 
fantasy.  Dannunzian portrayals of the femme fatale, then, undeniably 
embrace such a long standing tradition. However, read in a different 
and gendered context, D’Annunzio’s female character, by causing fear 
within her male counterpart by virtue of her sexually charged body, is a 
woman who has come back from the “darkness” of her “continent” to 
“deride”, dare I say “laugh” at the male protagonist’s constant struggle 
to cover her up with his own projections.
9
  She is a woman who has 
slashed a hole in man-made masquerades intended to protect the male 
gazer. And it is with and through this newly acquired sexual body that 
resistance can be found. Her body becomes a text written in a 
‘feminine writing’.
10
  The implications of such forms of resistance are 
                                                
9 By “dark continent” I am referring to Hélène Cixous: “Here [women] are, returning, arriving 
over and again, because the unconscious is impregnable. They have wandered around in 
circles, confined to the narrow room in which they’ve been given a deadly brainwashing. You 
[meaning men] can incarcerate them, slow them down, get away with the old Apartheid 
routine, but for a time only. As soon as they begin to speak, at the same as they are taught 
their name, they can be taught that their territory is black: because you are Africa, you are 
black. Your continent is dark. Dark is dangerous. You can’t see anything in the dark, you’re 
afraid. Don’t move, you might fall. Most of all, don’t go into the forest. And so we have 
internalized this horror of the dark” (“The laugh of the Medusa,” 336). 
10  By ‘feminine writing’ I am making specific reference to the French notion of an “écriture 
feminine.” In the hypothesis of an écriture féminine: rather than asking whether language 
produced sexuality, the question was inverted thereby proposing that sexuality might in fact 
produce language. If one could determine such a thing as a male symbolic discourse, that is, a 
means “through which man objectifies the world, reduces it to his terms, speaks in place of 
everything and everyone else – including women” then couldn’t that also mean that it would 
be possible to speak in the feminine, that is, to engender a symbolic discourse that is other – 
though not necessarily opposite – to what has up until now been imposed upon women and 
yet which is foreign to them? (“Writing The Body,” 362).  French feminists of the seventies 
such as Luce Irigaray, Hélène Cixous and Julia Kristeva, believed that change needed to start 
with women’s (re)experiencing of their once denied sexuality (jouissance). Expressing their 
sexuality would call for a new language – since it had never been named – which in turn 
would allow women to “establish a point of view (a site of différence) from which 
phallogocentric concepts and controls could be seen through and taken apart, not only in 
theory but in practice” (“Writing The Body,” 358). Given the fact that women’s bodies and 
their sexual pleasure have been excluded from male discourse, Irigaray believed that women’s 
bodies and the female jouissance marked a possible site from which women’s problematic 
relationship to (a male) language could begin to be solved (This Sex Which Is Not One). 
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two fold: on the one hand, in spite of the fact that representations of 
femininity are products of male thought, women can in fact rewrite and 
recode their stories, and therefore contribute to representations of 
female subjectivities that can be understood outside of the traditional 
codes of a patriarchal system. On the other hand, resistance through 
oscillation threatens the notion of fixed, uncontaminated oppositions 
upon which the male Western binary structure relies (man-woman, 
culture-nature, intellect-body, active-passive, good-evil…): the bar that 
separates opposition becomes ineffective, impotent. Suddenly good is 
no longer distinct from evil, culture becomes confused with nature, and 
man is faced with the threatening gaze of Medusa. 
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